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Abstract 
Using dynamic panel System GMM for 24 EMs over the period 1990-2014, we analyze 
how changes in sovereign ratings affect FDI inflows to EMs. The study also estimates the 
contagion effect of a ratings change among any of the BRICS countries on three regions, 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and Latin America and Asia. Third, we 
estimate the impact of a ratings change on FDI inflows in the presence of two types of 
crises, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis as well as country-specific crises. The results 
suggest that sovereign ratings have a statistically significant impact on the flow of FDI to 
EMs and that the BRICS countries as a bloc exert a statistically significant contagion 
impact on the FDI inflows into the three regions examined. We also find that the impact of 
a sovereign ratings change on FDI inflows increases in crisis times, both country-specific, 
as well as the global financial crisis.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Total gross FDI inflows averaged around 40-60% of aggregate capital flows to EMs since 
the mid-1990s. FDI flows to EMs surged from an average of US$40 billion annually in the 
early 1990s to US$300 billion per year in the mid-2000s (Koepke, 2015). Among EMs, the 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) arose as major recipients 
of FDI inflows, and by 2012, FDI inflows into them have reached 20% of total FDI, a more 
than three-fold increase relative to 6% in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2013). 2 
 Despite the recurring EM crises in the 1990s, capital flows into EMs continued to rise until 
the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. With the “Great Retrenchment” that followed, the 
effects were temporary for EMs relative to advanced economies.   In fact, capital inflows 
to EMs witnessed a speedy recovery, especially to the BRICS countries, which possibly 
bringing FDI close to the pre-crisis levels.3 
 
Figure (1): FDI Inflows in BRICS, and their Share in Global FDI 
 
                                               
2 One of the most significant episodes of FDI inflows to BRICS occurred over the period 2003-2008 when FDI inflows grew from USD 
77 bn  to USD 281 billion. China and Russia accounted for the largest share (UNCTAD, 2013).  
3 See Bussiere et. Al. (2016) for more information. Since 2010, however, cross-border financial flows reached a “new average,” below 
5% of GDP.  
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Source: UNCTAD (2013) 
Many reasons are behind the rise in capital flows to EMs over the last two decades, 
particularly since the onset of the global financial crisis, low interest rates, unconventional 
monetary policies in advanced economies. This made investments in EMs more attractive,4 
in addition to the stronger economic growth of EMs relative to advanced economies. The 
information provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on a country's creditworthiness has 
made it easier for investors to differentiate between countries when determining their 
investment decisions and accordingly the presence of CRAs has been another reason 
highlighted behind the rise in capital inflows into EMs. Emara and El Said (2015) held that 
the increase in the number of rated countries over time helped increase countries’ ability 
to raise funds at lower costs through accessing international capital marktes. 5  
Given the repeated EMs defaults and crises since the 1990s, in addition to the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis, CRAs have repeatedly come under scrutiny and a belief that 
CRAs have helped in deepening crises.6  The role of sovereign ratings in stimulating EMs' 
access to international capital markets implies that FDI inflows respond to rating changes 
(see Emara, and El Said, 2015). This response could also be contagious in crisis periods, 
particularly if the ratings change occurs in one of the big EMs or BRICS that absorb a 
significant bulk of FDI inflows. 7  
FDI inflows showed the most resilience to changes in global conditions in the last 
two decades and are relatively less volatile relative to other types of capital flows.8  The 
aim of the study is to analyze how the sovereign ratings upgrades and downgrades affects 
FDI inflows to EMs and whether a sovereign ratings’ change in another region explains 
the changes in FDI flows in a region. It also examines whether the presence of a crisis, 
country-specific or otherwise affects the impact of sovereign rating on FDI. The focus on 
                                               
4 See for example Fernandez-Arias (1996), Montiel and Reinhart, (1999). 
5 For more information on the effects of sovereign ratings on investment flows in EMs, see Fitch (2014).  
6 For more information on the instability of EM crises, see Calvo (1998). 
7 This could even be the case despite the fact that FDI contracted the least- relative to other types of EM capital inflows (Koepke, 
2015).  
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FDI reflects the fact that it has been less volatile than other types of capital flows in the last 
two decades. 9   
More specifically, the study aims at answering the following questions: How do 
sovereign rating changes affects FDI inflows to EMs? Can changes in FDI flows in one 
country be explained by a sovereign rating change in other countries? For the latter 
question, we focus on ratings changes among the BRICS countries and whether there is a 
contagion effect to EMs in three other regions: Latin America, Asia, and Central and 
Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa (CEEMEA).   The rest of this paper is divided as 
follows; section II reviews the relevant literature, section III explains the methodology, 
section IV documents our results, and section V concludes.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on sovereign ratings, capital flows in general, and FDI in particular, as well 
as contagion, is quite large and gained importance after the 1994 Mexican financial crisis, 
as highlighted in Emara and EL Said (2015). Cantor and Packer (1996) were among the 
pioneers showing that CRAs provide more information about speculative grade sovereigns 
than publicly available sources. The study by Reinhart (2002) and Kraussl (2003) 
emphasized on the importance of sovereign credit ratings for EMs because their volatile 
nature can affect their accessibility to international capital markets. Below, we highlight 
the literature on the main determinants of capital flows, with a focus on FDI, and then 
follow with the literature on sovereign ratings, and financial contagion.  
 
Determinants of Capital Flows 
A vast amount of literature focus on the push factors, or external factors, as determinants 
of capital flows. These push factors normally include GDP growth and interest rates in 
advanced economies, particularly U.S. interest rates (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart , 
1993; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1995; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Calvo and Reinhart, 
                                               
9 Bank flows, for instance, which accounted for the principal portion of the total capital flows prior to 2008, have plunged while, FDI 
flows were hardly impacted, to account for almost 45% of global flows in 2015/2016 (Bussiere et. Al., 2016).  
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1996, and Chuhan et al., 1998) and global risk aversion (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).10 
On the other hand, pull factors, or country-specific factors, encompass factors such as 
economic performance and market size, proxied by a country’s GDP growth rate (Dasgupta 
and Ratha 2000, and Hernandez, Mellado and Valdes 2001), inflation rates (Ahn et al. 
1998), and the stability of exchange rate (Lopez-Mejia 1999). Hernandez, Mellado and 
Valdes (2001) found that the most important factor affecting the country’s private capital 
flows is its individual characteristics (its fundamentals). Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and 
Volosovych (2005) found that the level of institutional quality is an important factor 
affecting capital flows.  Koepke (2016) highlights that these variables are more cyclical in 
nature, short-term, and differ across the varying phases of the business cycle. Other push 
and pull factors are more structural and long term in nature. Such push factors include 
portfolio diversification, information and communication technology, the rise of 
institutional investors, while such pull factors include quality of institutions, quality of 
institutions, and the role of government in an economy (Koepke, 2016).  
 
Determinants of FDI 
Research focusing on the determinants of FDI11 have been broadly in line with the findings 
above. FDI was found to be mainly affected by long-term factors governing the real 
economy, such as market size12 (Dunning, 1993; Garibalidi et. Al., 2002), more than by 
short-term financial- and external- fluctuations. Within a push-pull factor framework, 
domestic output growth has been largely undisputed as one of the leading determinants of 
FDI inflows (Koepke, 2015; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Hernandez et al. 2001; De Vita and 
Kyaw 2008). 13  Addison and Heshmati (2003) also found that trade openness and 
democracy positively affect FDI, while the level of perceived risk and indebtedness 
adversely affects it.   
                                               
10 This is particularly the case for pull factors.  
11 We are concerned with macro/country-level/exogenous determinants in this chapter. For more information on firm-specific FDI 
determinants, see Blonigen (2005).  
12 Proxied by GDP growth, or GDP per capita.  
13 Gupta and Ratha (2000) perhaps is an exception, finding that GDP growth had no significant effect on FDI flows. 
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Other pull factors that exert a significant and positive impact on FDI inflows 
include low government consumption as a share of GDP,14 and a low fiscal deficit 
(Albuquerque et al. 2005; Garibalidi et. Al., 2002), lower inflation (Walsh and Yu, 2010; 
Garibalidi et. Al., 2002),15 and weaker currency (Blonigen, 1997). Relatedly, Abbott et al. 
(2012) found that EMs employing fixed exchange rate regimes preserving currency 
stability—receive more FDI with flexible exchange rates. Institutional quality, governance, 
and low corruption also had positive impact on FDI inflows (Gastanaga et al 1998; 
Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006). However, FDI inflows are less affected relative to portfolio 
inflows by information frictions and institutional quality (Daude and Fratzscher, 2008).16 
Similarly, the only economic reforms that have played a significant role in driving FDI 
inflows in Latin America over the period 1980-1996 are trade and financial liberalization 
and limiting the risk of expropriation (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006).17  
A number of studies have also focused on the role of capital controls as a pull factor 
and their impact on FDI. Asiedu and Lien (2004) found that the impact of capital controls—
restrictions on the capital account, repatriation of export proceeds, and the presence of 
several exchange rates—on FDI varied by region and changed over time. Since the 1990s, 
all three types of capital controls have had a significant impact on FDI, with the greatest 
adverse effect in East Asia and Latin America. Elo (2007) find that increasing capital 
controls decreases the duration of FDI investments at specific levels of country risk. This 
is quite relevant as it relates to how FDI responds to capital controls in an environment of 
changing country risk.18  Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015) focused on financial sector FDI 
inflows,and found that capital controls increased the probability of increases in financial 
sector FDI.  
As for push factors, Koepke (2015) held that push factors mattered the least for FDI 
but given the interest in global risk aversion with the onset of the global financial crisis, a 
number of studies have examined the impact of changes in global risk aversion on FDI 
                                               
14 Proxy for the size of the government in the economy 
15 Although they found that this mattered more for advanced economies relative to EMs. 
16 both debt and equity  
17 Tax reforms, privatizations, international capital liberalization, and regime type were not found to be significant determinants of FDI.  
18 Moody’s sovereign ratings were among their measures for country risk. 
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inflows.19 Most of these studies have had mixed results. Rey (2015) found a positive 
correlation between the VIX and FDI inflows20 into EMs, while Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 
(2011)21 found that  global risk aversion has a negative impact on FDI however the impact 
is smaller when compared to other types of  capital flows.  Albuqerque (2005) found no 
relationship between FDI and global risk aversion.  
Further work examined output growth in advanced economies as a push factor but 
have been inconclusive. De Vita and Kyaw (2008) obtained mixed results,22 depending on 
the model employed, while Gupta and Ratha (2000) found no significant impact. 
Albuquerque et al. (2005 and 2002) found both a negative and positive23 relationship, 
respectively, between global growth and FDI into EMs, but found that asset return 
indicators have no impact on FDI inflows because of their long-term nature, given FDI’s 
lack of volatility. World Bank (1997) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) found that asset 
return volatility discourages FDI.  
Using fixed effects approach, the study of Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel (2013) found that 
in financially open economies, less developed EMs usually have net capital inflows.24 This 
result applied for FDI when capital flows are disaggregated, as well.  Albuquerque (2005) 
found that global factors are more important than domestic factors in determining the 
variations in FDI flows.  Forbes (2012) held that countries are more prone to contagion if 
they are more dependent on trade (relative to GDP) and have banking systems that are 
leveraged, but are not prone to contagion simply if they have larger capital inflows.  Using 
SURs, Forbes and Warnock (2012) found that variability in global risk is statisticaly 
significantly related with variability in capital flow. The study also found minimal links 
between capital controls and the probability of capital flows surging or stopping. 
As for contagion, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1997), and Glick and Rose (1998) 
found that trade links are the main channels through which financial crises become 
                                               
19 Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) held that a risk aversion shock tends to affect capital flows through two main channels; 1) re-
assessment of risk, which causes capital flight from more vulnerable economies; and 2) investment contraction and lower global trade.  
20 But it was significantly negatively associated with fluctuations in other types of capital inflows. 
21 They also examined capital flow retrenchment. 
22 A SVAR context yielded a positive relationship, but in alternative specifications, they found a negative but insignificant relationship.  
23 The positive relationship was mainly related to vertical FDI flows, that is, investments related to an integrated international supply 
chain that meets external demand (Koepke, 2015), whereas horizontal FDI to be affected more by pull factors/macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
24 More advanced economies experienced net capital outflows. 
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contagious.25 In a panel study on Latin American countries, Chuhan, Claessens, and 
Mamingi (1993) found that bond flows were more responsive than equity flows to any 
change in country’s credit rating.  Soon after, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) found evidence 
of “large neighbor effects” on capital flows to and from Latin America from 1970 to 1993.  
One of the most recent studies that attempt to capture sovereign ratings, capital flows, and 
contagion was that of Chen et. al (2016), who studied the impact of a sovereign rating 
changes and found that due to financial and trade linkages any rating revisions lead to 
significant output spillover effects within the same quarter of the ratings change. The 
authors attribute spillovers to both direct and indirect financial and trade linkages between 
event and non-event countries.  
Country-specific studies on the impact of sovereign ratings and FDI showed that a positive 
relationship between FDI inflows and ratings upgrades in the case of Turkey (Bayar and 
Kilic, 2014) and Romania (Popa, 2012), while rating downgrades in South Africa adversely 
affect FDI inflows (Mugobo and Mutize, 2016).  
 
DATA26 
 
The study analyzes the impact of a group of pull factors and push factors on the flow of 
FDI for a group of The data set includes 24 EMs over the period 1990-2014, where table 1 
provide a list of countries in our sample.  
                                  Table 1 –List of EMs included in the Sample 
1 Argentina  13 Malaysia 
2 Brazil  14 Mexico 
3 Chile 15 Peru 
4 China 16 Philippines   
5 Columbia 17 Poland 
6 Czech Republic 18 Russia 
7 Egypt 19 Singapore 
8 Greece 20 South Africa 
9 Hong Kong 21 South Korea 
10 Hungary 22 Thailand 
11 India  23 Turkey 
12 Indonesia 24 Venezuela  
                                               
25 For more information on the literature that surveyed contagion, see Emara and El Said (2015).  
26 The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the World Bank Database at 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. 
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The dependent variable in the model is FDI (as a percent of GDP) and the set of 
independent variables consists of the current account balance as a percent of GDP, the real 
interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings, 
the weighted average of the G-727 real GDP growth rate, and the weighted average of the 
G-7 real interest rate. The data set is extracted from the World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank’s database. 
Table 2 provides a detailed list of the variables used, definition, unit of 
measurement, and data source. 
Table 2 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name 
Definition 
Unit of 
Measurement 
Data Source 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown 
in the balance of payments. This series shows net 
inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in 
the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is 
divided by GDP.  
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Sovereign debt 
rating 
The capacity and willingness of a government to meet its 
obligations in full and on time. It is the risk facing an 
investor who holds debt securities issued by that 
government which in turn reflects its credit worthiness. 
 
AAA = 24, 
AA+ = 23,.., D 
= 128 
Standard & 
Poor website. 
 
Inflation 
 
The percentage change in consumer price index. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Real Interest Rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Current Account 
Balance (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary 
income, and net secondary income. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Growth of real 
per capita GDP 
Change in the log of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US$). (Authors’ computation.) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
G-7 real GDP 
growth rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP per 
capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors’ computation.) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
G-7 real interest 
rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP per 
capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors’ computation.) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
Capital Controls 
Index 
An index which includes restrictions on equity flows, 
bond flows, money markets, collective investments, local 
Index Fernandez et. 
Al. (2015).  
                                               
27 France, Canada, Italy, Germany, U.S., U.K. and Japan. 
28AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, C, RD, SD, D.  For detailed 
definition on each rating classification check S&P website https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/sourceId/504352. 
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purchases by non-residents, purchases abroad by 
residents, and others. 
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION & METHODOLOGY 
 
The first part of the estimation methodology examines the impact of changes in sovereign 
debt ratings on the flow of FDI as a percent of GDP. Second, we analyze the possible 
contagion effect from the BRICS countries to other EMs in the sample. Third, the 
contagious effect of each of the five BRICS countries on three regions namely Asian29, 
EMEA30, and Latin American31 countries is analyzed. Finally, the study analyzes the effect 
of the changes in rating on the flow of FDI in the presence of two types of crises; global 
financial crisis of 2007 and country’s crisis. 
 
To perform the first part of the model specification, the following dynamic panel regression 
model examines the impact of changes in sovereign debt ratings on the flow of FDI (as a 
percent of GDP32),  
!"#$,& = α + 	ρ!"#$,&,- + 	βX0,1,- + δZ0,1,- 	+ λR0,1,- +	ε0,1															(1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t = 1990,…T 
 
Where FDIit denotes the ratio of net inflows from foreign investors to GDP, of country i at 
time t, FDIit-1 is the AR(1) endogenous variable,  Xit-1 is the vector of pull factors, Zit-1 is 
the vector push factors, Rit-1 is the sovereign debt rating, and εit is the error term of the 
regression.  
The vector of pull factors includes the current account balance as a share of GDP, 
the real interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, current account as a share of 
GDP, and Standard and Poor's sovereign debt ratings where the change in the rating is as 
defined in Gande and Parsley (2003). The vector of push factors contains two variables 
                                               
29  Asian region includes nine countries namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Thailand. 
30 Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region includes eight countries namely Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
31 Latin America region includes seven countries namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
32 To control for country size. 
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namely the weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate and the weighted average 
of the G-7 real interest rate.  
The FDI model is estimated using dynamic panel System GMM proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000). 
This methodology combines together Equation (1) with Equation (2) below, 
 
:!"#$,& − !"#$,&,-<
= α + 	ρ:!"#$,&,- − !"#$,&,=< + 	β:X0,1,- − X0,1,=< + δ(Z0,1,- − δZ0,1,=) 	
+ λ(R0,1,- − R0,1,=) +	(ε0,1 − ε0,1,-	)																																																											(2) 
 
where the additional moments conditions for the equation in levels are as follows,  
?@△ !"#$,&B$,&C = 0, !EF	G = 2,… , I 
																				?@△ J$,&B$,&C = 0, !EF	G = 2,… , I                                        (3) 
 
where is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1) except the push factors, 
Zi,t.  
Using dynamic panel regression model, the following model is formed and used to 
estimate the contagion effect from the BRICS countries to other EMs in the sample, 
																			!"#$,& = K + 	L!"#$,&,- + 	MN$,&,- + OP$,&,- 	+ QRST,&,-
U
TV-
+	B$,&													(4) 
 
where the dependent variable, vectors of push and pull factors are the same as before while 
replacing the rating variable with the weighted average of the BRICS countries’ rating 
controlled for country size and denoted by the variable ∑ ST,&UTV-  . This variable is used to 
estimate the extent to which a sovereign ratings downgrade (upgrade) in the BRICS 
countries affects FDI to flow out of (into) other EMs in the sample. In addition, the study 
analyzes the contagious effect of each of the five BRICS countries on three regions namely 
M
i,t
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Asian33, EMEA34, and Latin American35 countries. To do so, Equation (4) is estimated for 
each of the five BRICS countries in a turn to test the extent to which rating changes affect 
the flow of FDI in the three regions namely Asia, EMEA, and Latin America. 
The last part of the methodology analyses the impact of the changes in ratings on 
the flow of FDI in the presence of two types of crises; the global financial crisis and 
country’s specific crisis by adding a dummy variable D0,1 to the model, as shown in 
Equation (5), to account for the two types of crises each one in a turn. For instance, to 
account for the global financial crisis the dummy variable takes 1 for the years 2007 to 
2009 and zero otherwise and to account for country’s specific crisis the dummy variable 
takes 1 for country i at time t of the crisis and zero otherwise.   
															!"#$,& = α + 	ρ!"#$,&,- + 	βX0,1,- + δZ0,1,- 	+ λR0,1,- + θD0,1,- 
																																																																+ϑ(D0,1,- ∗ R0,1,-) +	ε0,1																																											(5) 
 
The total effect of a crisis, whether global financial crisis or country’s crisis, is 
estimated by adding up the coefficient ^  to the coefficient _ and their statistical significance 
is determined by from their variances and covariance of the variables D0,1,- and R0,1,-. 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Using the Arellano-Bond System GMM estimation methodology, the model is estimated 
under nine specifications where FDI is regressed on the set of independent variables.  This 
estimation methodology is best at dealing with simultaneous causality and possible 
correlation between country’s fixed effects and the set of explanatory variables. 
The set of instruments used in the model are valid instruments. More specifically, the set 
of instruments passed the relevance test and the overidentification test as computed by the 
Hansen test and its p-value.  
                                               
33  Asian region includes nine countries namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Thailand. 
34 Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region includes eight countries namely Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
35 Latin America region includes seven countries namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
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Table 3 shows the estimation results of the FDI model, where our results build further on 
Emara and El Said (2015)36 by including a capital controls index among our set of 
explanatory variables while testing for the impact of sovereign ratings changes on FDI.  
Column (1) confirms that the AR(1) term is positive and statistically significant as 
expected. In Column (2), when the lagged GDP growth rate is added to the regression, the 
coefficient of the lagged FDI remains positive and statistically significant. The results of 
this column show that the coefficient of GDP growth is also significant where a one percent 
increase leads to about 0.23 percent (of GDP) increase in FDI. Once again, this confirms 
the literature that held that domestic output growth is one of the leading determinants of 
FDI flows, as shown by Gastanaga et al. (1998), Hernandez et al. (2001), and Koepke 
(2015). Table (1a) in Annex II displays the results from El Said and Emara (2015) without 
the capital controls index where we can see that the coefficient of GDP growth is almost 
double (0.49) that of Table (1) in the presence of capital controls.   
In Column 3 (Table 1), the lagged sovereign ratings variable is added to the regression, 
where a one notch rating upgrade results in  about 0.11 percent (of GDP) increase in FDI. 
The coefficients on lagged FDI and GDP growth remained statistically significant after the 
addition of ratings, as our main variables of interest.37 To our knowledge, few studies have 
focused mainly on the link between FDI and sovereign ratings, but our results are in line 
with those of Kim and Wu (2008), who found that an improvement in sovereign ratings 
increases FDI into EMs.   
Column 4 shows the regression with where the lagged inflation is added to the regression, 
whereby inflation is included as a proxy for macroeconomic stability (Walsh and Wu, 
2010). The coefficient of the lagged inflation rate shows an expected negative and 
statistically significant impact on FDI, where a 1 percent increase in inflation leads to 0.001 
percent drop in FDI. While this is a small coefficient, this result is suggestive of a link 
between inflation and FDI inflows are linked, while when other studies found no significant 
link, even at the 10% level (see Arbatli, 2011 for example). 38 Columns (5) and (6) of Table 
                                               
36 Selected results from Emara and El Said (2015) will be highlighted.   
37 The coefficient of the lagged rating in Table (1b), the model that excluded the capital controls index, is slightly above 
that of Table (1), at 0.14.  
38 Table (1b) also showed that the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate shows a statistically insignificant impact on FDI, 
in line with a number of other studies. 
 14 
(1) shows that adding the lagged real interest rate and lagged current account balance as a 
percent of GDP do not have a statistical significant impact on FDI, highlighting the fact 
that market size matters more in our sample, even though we expect a positive relationship 
between real interest rates and FDI (Addison and Heshmati, 2003).39 The insignificant 
result of the current account balance in Column (6) goes in line aligns with the literature 
on the non-robust evidence between widening current account deficit as a measure of 
increased financial need (or as a measure of country risk) and the different types of capital 
flows in EMs (Koepke, 2015). 
When we add the lagged capital controls index to the regression in Column 7, our results 
show that a one-unit increase in this index leads to a drop in FDI of around 0.041 percent 
(of GDP), an expected result, at the one percent significance level. This is in line with 
Asiedo and Lien (2004), who show that capital controls adversely affect FDI, with the 
results most significant during the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 1980s. Elo (2007) also 
found similar results whereby more capital controls decreases the duration of FDI 
investments at specific levels of country risk.40 
As of Column 8, we introduce our push factors into the model, whereby we add the 
weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate to the regression, which shows a 
statistical insignificant impact on net FDI inflows to EMs. Similarly, in  Column 9 our 
second push factor, the G-7 real interest rate shows an insignificant effect on net FDI 
inflows to EMs.41 This result aligns with the majority of the literature, which finds an 
unclear relationship between interest and FDI in EMs (World Bank, 1997; Montiel & 
Reinhard, 1999; Hernandez, Mellado & Valdes, 2001; De Vita & Kyaw, 2008; Koepke, 
2015), and that pull factors mattered more for FDI.42 
                                               
39 Our portfolio results also show that real interest rates, as well as the (nominal) policy rates were not a significant 
determinant of portfolio inflows, but the interest rate differential- in nominal terms- mattered. [More importantly, there 
little evidence of a link between the current account balance and FDI in this context, although Fry et al. (1995) held that 
a large current account deficit could worsen a country’s investment climate, thereby adversely affecting FDI. 
40 Elo’s country risk parameter was financial distress. Other than through decreasing durations, FDI investors may decide 
not to enter at all into the results of that study.  
41 Similar results for the two push factors were obtained in the simpler, published version shown in Table (1a). 
42 Cerutti et al. (2017) reached a similar conclusion, holding that the explanatory power of push factors, particularly 
monetary policy, is limited, both in absolute terms, and in relation to pull factors, as is shown above.  
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Table (3a) shows more parsimonious models of the impact of ratings on FDI.43 The 
results show no significant change in the coefficients of the remaining variables in terms 
of signs and statistical significance. The third specification (Column 3) shows the model 
with excluding only the capital control index from the regression, and the results again 
show no significant change in the remaining coefficients. The last specification (Column 
4) reports the results after dropping inflation, real interest rate, current account, and capital 
control index from the regression, the results show that the coefficients of lagged FDI, real 
GDP growth, sovereign rating, G-7 real growth rate, and G-7 real interest rate are 
statistically significant. Albuquerque et al. (2005) present an exception to the push-factor 
literature above, which accords with Table (1a). In a sample of advanced and emerging 
economies they found the average G3 interest rate negatively affects FDI inflows. Oppostie 
to this results, Gupta and Ratha (2000) find that international interest rate has a positive 
significant impact on FDI flows, so the results on push factors in the context of FDI is 
varied. Given the lower significance of push factors in the FDI literature, we do not include 
further push factors, such as global risk aversion, which is normally highlighted as one of 
the most important push factors but was not found to have an impact on FDI based on the 
literature.44    
The results of Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in differenced residuals and the 
results of all regressions suggest no autocorrelation in second order. Additionally, the 
Hansen test results confirm that over-identifying conditions are correctly specified.  
Table 4 shows the parsimonious model with adding a dummy variable for rating that 
takes 1 for investment grade and 0 for speculative grade. As expected, a movement from a 
speculative to an investment grade increases FDI by about 1.5% as a percent of GDP. 
To further analyze the impact of rating on FDI, Table 5 estimates the contagion effect 
of the BRICS countries on the different countries of our sample. The BRICS Rating 
variable is simply a weighted average of the five countries weighted by their real GDP. As 
                                               
43 Column 1 of the table shows the full model with all regressors included. Column 2 reports the results for a smaller 
model where the three insignificant regressors in Table (1) – inflation, real interest rate, and current account – are removed 
from the regression. 
44 Arbatli (2011) found correlation was limited to times of crisis between 2006 and 2008, when FDI inflows declined, 
but the decline was not necessarily VIX related. 
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the results suggest, in all the nine specifications, BRICS as a region exert a positive 
statistically significant contagion effect on EMs in the sample.  
To analyze the impact of the changes in the rating of one country how it might affect 
the flow of FDI in other EMs, Table 6 shows that the changes in the rating of each of the 
five BRICS countries has a significant contagion effect on the rest of the EMs. For instance, 
a one-classification increase in the rating of Brazil leads to 0.18% increase in the flow of 
FDI as a percent of GDP for EMs in the sample. 
Next, to study the contagion effect of each BRICS countries on different regions, the 
sample is divided into three regions namely Asia, EMEA, and Latin America. Table 7 
reports the results of the regional contagious effect for each one of the five BRICS 
countries. As the results of the first row show, the changes in sovereign rating in Brazil 
leads to an increase in net FDI inflows to the three regions with the highest increase is in 
the Asian countries where a one-classification increase in Brazil’s rating results in 0.47% 
increase in FDI as a percent of GDP flown to Asian economies. Similar to the results of 
Brazil, Russia’s rating – in the second column- exerts an important contagious impact on 
the flow of FDI to the three regions under analysis. The highest impact is however on Asian 
countries where a one classification increase in Russia’s rating leads to about 0.27 percent 
increase in FDI as a percent of GDP and the least impact is on the Latin American countries 
where the same increase in rating leads to only about 0.07% increase in FDI as a percent 
of GDP. In the case of India, a ratings change has a statistical positive significant impact 
on the three regions with the highest contagious effect is on the Asian countries and the 
least on Latin American countries. More specifically, a one-classification increase in 
India’s rating leads to about 0.51% and 0.12% increase in FDI to Asian countries and Latin 
American countries, respectively. Similarly, the fourth row shows that China has a 
statistically significant regional contagious effect with the highest effect on the Asian 
countries and the least on the Latin American countries. As the table shows, a one-
classification increase in China’s rating leads to about 0.37% and 0.09% increase in FDI 
to Asian countries and Latin American countries, respectively. Finally, the results of South 
Africa’s regional contagious effect are shown in the fifth row. As the results suggest, this 
country’s rating increase has a positive statistically significant impact on the flow of FDI 
to the three regions with the highest impact is on the Asian countries and the least on the 
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Latin American countries. More specifically, a one unit increase in the rating index leads 
to about 0.42% and 0.09% increase in FDI to Asian countries and Latin American 
countries, respectively. Again, for all regressions, the Arrelano-Bond test fails to reject the 
presence of serial correlation of order 1 but rejects it for order 2. And the Hansen test 
confirms that the overidentifying restrictions are correctly specified.  
The last part of the analysis examines the effect of rating variability on FDI flows 
during two crises; global financial crisis of 2007 and country’s crises over the period of the 
study. To measure the total effect of the global financial crisis, a dummy variable that takes 
1 for the period of 2007 onwards and zero otherwise and its interaction term with the rating 
variable are added to the model.  
As expected, the results of Tables (9) suggest that the  global financial crisis of 2007  
has an important effect on net inflow of FDI flows to EMs. The computation of the total 
effect of the crises on FDI flows shows a positive and a statistically significant coefficient, 
where a one-classification decrease in the rating leads to about 0.20% decrease in FDI 
during the times of no crisis versus 0.30% in times of the crisis. 
Finally, Table (10) shows the impact of rating in the presence of a country-specific crisis.45 
As the results show, a ratings change has a greater impact on the flow of FDI in times of a 
country’s crisis, to an even greater extent than the impact shown in in Table (9), during the 
global financial crisis. For instance, a one-classification decrease in the index results in a 
reduction in FDI flows by about 0.64% during a country-specific crisis respectively, but 
only 0.15% at other times. Both effects are statistically significant. Once again, this 
confirms the importance of country fundamentals, more than changes in global conditions, 
in affecting FDI flows.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Using dynamic panel System GMM for 24 EMs over the period 1990-2014, the results 
suggest that sovereign ratings are an important factor for the flow of FDI into EMs. A 
rating change in a BRICS country displays a negative and statistically significant impact 
on FDI flowing into EMs in all three regions including Asia, EMEA, and Latin American 
                                               
45 Such as the Mexican, Asian, or Brazilian crises of the 1990s.  
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countries with the highest impact witnessed in Asia. Our results show that the presence of 
a financial crisis, whether country-specific or otherwise, increases the magnitude of the 
impact of a sovereign rating change on FDI flows. Specifically, a one-notch decrease in 
sovereign rating during the times of a crisis reduces FDI inflows relative to the impact 
during tranquil times. 
 
VII. REFERENCES 
Ahn, Y.S., S. Adji, and T. Willett (1998). The Effects of Inflation and Exchange Rate 
Policies on Direct Investment to Developing Countries. International Economic Journal 
12, pp. 95-104. 
Addison, Tony, and Almas Heshmati. 2003. “The New Global Determinants of FDI Flows 
to Developing Countries: The Importance of ICT and Democratization.” WIDER 
Discussion Papers/World Institute for Development Economics, no. 2003/45. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991); “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, 277-297. 
Albuquerque, Rui, (2003), “The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing 
through Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of International Economics  
61 (2): pp. 353–83.  
______. (2005). World Market Integration through the Lens of Foreign Direct Investors. 
Journal of International Economics 66, no. 2: 267-295. 
Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych. (2005). Capital Flows in 
a Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions. Paper Prepared for the NBER 
Conference on International Capital Flows, December 17-18, 2004. Online  
http://www.people.hbs.edu/lalfaro/CapitalFlowsGlobalizedWorld.pdf  
Asiedo, E. and D. Lien. (2004). CapitalControls and Foreign Direct Investment. World 
Development. Vol. 32(3). Pp 479-490.  
Blonigen, Bruce, 2005, “A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 11299. 
Biglaiser, Glen, and Karl R. DeRouen. 2006. “Economic Reforms and Inflows of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 41, no. 1: 51-75. 
Calvo, G., Leiderman, L. and C. Reinhart. (1993). Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate 
Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors. IMF Working Paper 92/62.   
Calvo, S. and C. Reinhart (1996). Capital Flows to Latin America, Is There Evidence of 
Contagion? in: Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, Guillermo Calvo, Morris 
Goldstein, and Eduard Hochreiter, eds., (Washington, DC: Institute for 
InternationalEconomics). 
 19 
Caselli, Francesco & Esquivel, Gerardo & Lefort, Fernando, 1996. " Reopening the 
Convergence Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics," Journal of 
Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 363-89, September.  
Chuhan, P., S. Claessens, and N. Mamingi. 1993. Equity and Bond Flows to Asia and Latin 
America. The World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers, No.1160.  
Das Gupta, D., and D. Ratha. 2000. “What Factors Appear to Drive Private Capital Flows 
to Developing Countries? And how Does Official Lending Respond?” Vol. 2392. World 
Bank Publications. 
Daude, Christian, and Marcel Fratzscher. 2008. “The Pecking Order of Cross-Border 
Investment.” Journal of International Economics 74, no. 1: 94-119. 
De Vita, Glauco, and Khine S. Kyaw. 2008. “Determinants of Capital Flows to Developing 
Countries: A Structural VAR Analysis." Journal of Economic Studies 35, no. 4: 304-322. 
Dell’Erba, S. and D. Reinhardt. (2015). FDI, Debt, and Capital Controls. Journal of 
International Money and Finance. Vol 58. PP. 29-50.  
Dunning, J., H. (1993). The Theory of Transnational Corporations. Routledge, London, 
16-18. 
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz (1995) “Exchange Market 
Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks,” Economic Policy 21, 
pp.249-312. 
Emara, N. and A. El Said. (2015). Revisiting Sovereign Ratings, Capital Flows, and 
Financial Contagion in Emerging Markets. World Journal of Applied Economics. Vol 2, 
pp. 3-22.  
Fernandez-Arias, E. and P. Montiel. (1995), The Surgein Capital Inflows to Developing 
Countries: An Analytical Overview. The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 1.  
Fernandez-Arias, E. (1996).  The New Wave of Private Capital Inflows: Push or Pull? 
Journal of Development Economics 48, pp. 389-418. 
Fernandez, A., Klein, M.W., Rebucci, A., Schnidler, M., and M. Uribe. (2015). Capital 
Controls Measures: A New Dataset. IMF Working Paper. Online. Available here. IMF 
Working Paper 15/80 
Fitch. (2014). Sovereign Credit Ratings and Least Developed Countries. Online. Available 
here.  
Forbes, C. (2012). The “Big C”: Identifying Contagion. NBER Working Paper No. 18465. 
Online. Available here.  
Forbes, K. and F. Warnock. (2012). Capital Flow Waves: Surgest, Stops, Flight, and 
Retrenchment. Journal of International Economics. Vol 88(2), pp. 235-251.  
Garibaldi, P., Mora, N., Sahay, R. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2002). What moves capital to 
transition economies? IMF working paper, WP/02/64. 
 20 
Gastanaga, Victor M., Jeffrey B. Nugent, and Bistra Pashamova. 1998. “Host Country 
Reforms and FDI Inflows: How Much Difference Do They Make?" World Development 
26, no. 7: 1299-1314. 
Glick, Reuven & Rose, Andrew K, (1998), "Contagion and Trade: Why are Currency 
Crises Regional," CEPR Discussion Papers 1947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.  
Hernandez, L., P. Mellado, and R. Valdes. (2001), Determinants of Private Capital Flows 
in the 1970s and 1990s: Is There Evidence of Contagion? IMF Working Paper, No. 01/64.  
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey and H. Rosen (1988), “Estimating Vector Autoregressions 
with Panel Data”, Econometrica, 56, 1371-1395. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Short-run pain, long-run gain: The effects of financial 
liberalization. World Bank Policy Research,Working Paper 2912 
Kim, A.Sj., and E. Wu. (2008). Sovereign Credit Ratings, Capital Flows and Financial 
Sector Development in Emerging Markets. Emerging Markets Review. Vol 9(1). Pp17-39.  
Koepke, R. (2015). What Drives Capital Flows to Emerging Markets? A Survey of the 
Empirical Literature. IIF Working Paper. Online. Available here (by subscription).   
Kraussl, R. (2003). Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Contribute to Financial 
Contagion in Emerging Market Crises? Center for Financial Studies. No. 2003/22.  
Juttner, J. D., and J. McCarthy (1998), Modeling a Ratings Crisis (unpublished, Sydney, 
Australia: Macquarie University), www.econ.mq.edu.au/courses/econ360/Soveig1.pdf  
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria, and Cédric Tille. 2011. “The Great Retrenchment:   
International Capital Flows during the Global Financial Crisis.” Economic Policy 26, no. 
66: 289-346. 
Reinhart, C., 2002. Default, currency crises, and sovereign credit ratings. World Bank 
Economic Review. 16, 151–170. 
Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2003. “FDI to Africa: The Role of Price Stability 
and Currency Instability.” IMF Working Paper no. 3-10. 
Rey, H. (2015). Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy 
Independence.” NBER Working Paper 21162. 
Taylor, M.P., Sarno, L., (1997), Capital flows to developing countries: long- and short-
term determinants. The World Bank Economic Review 11 3, 451–470 
UNCTAD. (2013). The Rise of BRICS FDI and Africa. UNCTAD Trends Monitor. Online. 
Available here 
Walsh, J.P., and J. Yu. (2010). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectoral and 
Institutional Approach. IMF Working Paper 10/87.  
World Bank Database (2018), World Bank database. Online. Available here. 
 
 
 21 
Appendix I 
Linear Transformation of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
 
Ratings Transformation Methodology 
Using the linear transformations above, we convert a country’s sovereign rating into 
numbers, taking into consideration the day that a ratings change has occurred in addition 
to changes in the outlook (an outlook is either stable, or positive or negative).  Sovereign 
ratings are represented on a scale from 0 (Serial Default) to 20 (AAA), and every change 
in the ratings outlook is given a weight of +0.3 (positive outlook), -3 (negative outlook), 
and 0 (Stable Outlook), and a -0.5 for Negative Watch. The lower value of the positive and 
                                               
46 Ratings of BB+ and below are classified as speculative- or junk- grade.  
Rating Transformation  
AAA 20 
AA+ 19 
AA 18 
AA- 17 
A+ 16 
A 15 
A- 14 
BBB+ 13 
BBB 12 
BBB- 11 
BB+ 46 10 
BB 9 
BB- 8 
B+ 7 
B 6 
B- 5 
CCC+ 4 
CCC 3 
CCC- 2 
CC 1 
SD 0 
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negative outlook (+0.3/-0.3), implies that a ratings change is possible within three months 
to a year, whereas a Negative Watch implies a more imminent ratings cut within three 
months or less. Hence it has a slightly more weight relative to the Negative Outlook. For 
example, Brazil’s rating changed from BB/Watch Neg to BB/Negative on August 15, 2017. 
That is, its rating stood at 9 with -0.5 for the negative watch, rendering it an 8.5 score for 
the first 15 days of August, and as of August 16, its rating gets numerically adjusted to 9 
for the rating (BB), and -0.3 for the negative rating outlook, giving it a score of 8.7. On a 
monthly basis, Brazil’s rating would be calculated as follows 
August 2017 = (8.5*15+8.7*16)/31 
The average monthly rating is divided by the number of days in our month of interest. 
September’s rating- and onwards- would be 8.7 until another ratings change occurs, and a 
similar ratings adjustment occur, with the weighted average rating calculation driven by 
the number of days in the month. After obtaining a monthly series of ratings in numerical 
form, these ratings are averaged (three-months) to obtain quarterly ratings for our 
regressions.  
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APPENDIX II;  
 
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
          
FDI it-1 0.698*** 0.697*** 0.606*** 0.601*** 0.608*** 0.606*** 0.579*** 0.597*** 0.597*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0396) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0250) (0.0313) (0.0457) (0.0594) (0.0590) 
GDP Growth it-1  0.230** 0.202** 0.252** 0.276*** 0.267** 0.312*** 0.214*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0919) (0.0825) (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.120) (0.0789) (0.0698) 
Rating it-1   0.110*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 
   (0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0332) (0.0288) (0.0534) (0.0511) (0.0562) 
Inflation it-1    -0.000780** -0.0347* -0.0350* 0.00963 0.00688 0.0104 
    (0.000390) (0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0234) (0.0273) (0.0337) 
Real Interest Rate it-1     0.00174 0.00273 0.00732 -0.0209 -0.0192 
     (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0397) (0.0411) 
Current Account it-1      0.0260 -0.00770 0.0115 0.0111 
      (0.0633) (0.0610) (0.0477) (0.0472) 
Capital Control Index it-1       -0.0408*** -0.0446*** -0.0438*** 
       (0.0149) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
G-7 Growth it        0.458 0.477* 
        (0.298) (0.290) 
G-7 Real Interest it         -0.0389 
         (0.119) 
          
Observations 556 556 507 448 404 404 359 359 359 
Number of country 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test          
Order 1 p-value 0.0423 0.0331 0.0235 0.0296 0.0307 0.0301 0.0231 0.0217 0.0216 
Order 2 p-value 0.2086 0.2159 0.2225 0.2216 0.2244 0.2214 0.2301 0.2200 0.2187 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI 
     
FDI it-1 0.597*** 0.604*** 0.625*** 0.620*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0399) (0.0453) (0.0329) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.207*** 0.142** 0.165*** 0.124** 
 (0.0698) (0.0616) (0.0619) (0.0563) 
Rating it-1 0.223*** 0.188*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0446) (0.0406) (0.0430) 
Inflation it-1 0.0104  -0.0205  
 (0.0337)  (0.0276)  
Real Interest Rate it-1 -0.0192  -0.0150  
 (0.0411)  (0.0353)  
Current Account it-1 0.0111  0.0225  
 (0.0472)  (0.0520)  
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0438*** -0.0316*   
 (0.0164) (0.0166)   
G-7 Growth it 0.477* 0.413* 0.514* 0.434* 
 (0.290) (0.224) (0.287) (0.224) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0389 -0.0613 -0.180 -0.177** 
 (0.119) (0.0808) (0.114) (0.0865) 
     
Observations 359 442 404 507 
Number of country 23 24 23 24 
Arellano-Bond Test:     
Order 1 p-value 0.0216 0.0185 0.0270 0.0208 
Order 2 p-value 0.2187 0.2198 0.2096 0.2134 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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                                                                          Table 4: Investment v.s Speculative Grade: Rating on FDI  
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES FDI 
  
FDI it-1 0.655*** 
 (0.0279) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.183** 
 (0.0756) 
Dummy Rating it-1 1.488*** 
 (0.533) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.00764 
 (0.0129) 
G-7 Growth it 0.362 
 (0.227) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0281 
 (0.0735) 
  
Observations 447 
Number of country 24 
  
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                   
 
0.03 
Order 2 p-value                                   0.22 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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    Table 5: BRICS Contagion Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
        
FDI it-1 0.612*** 0.616*** 0.619*** 0.619*** 0.614*** 0.629*** 0.623*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0335) (0.0514) (0.0528) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.288** 0.314** 0.346*** 0.343*** 0.387** 0.241*** 0.261*** 
 (0.116) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126) (0.155) (0.0942) (0.0900) 
BRICS Rating it-1 0.110*** 0.106** 0.105** 0.102*** 0.169*** 0.202*** 0.208*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0415) (0.0474) (0.0357) (0.0510) (0.0544) (0.0529) 
Inflation it-1  -0.0001 0.000199 0.000216 -0.00151 -0.0055 -0.0199 
  (0.00010) (0.000143) (0.000197) (0.0315) (0.0357) (0.0366) 
Real Interest Rate it-1   0.0303** 0.0321 0.0489 -0.0186 -0.0335 
   (0.0139) (0.0197) (0.0297) (0.0619) (0.0645) 
Current Account it-1    0.00982 -0.00536 0.00289 0.00306 
    (0.0590) (0.0667) (0.0562) (0.0557) 
Capital Control 
Index it-1 
    -0.0310*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0437*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.0481*** 
(0.0164) 
G-7 Growth it      0.704* 0.643*’ 
      (0.407) (0.405) 
G-7 Real Interest it       0.132*’ 
       (0.0819) 
        
Observations 416 393 344 344 284 284 284 
Number of country 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
 
0.0278
 
0.0337 
 
0.0347 
 
0.0348 
 
0.0400 
 
0.0336 
 
0.0360 
Order 2 p-value 0.2210 0.2185 0.2207 0.2185 0.2198 0.2041 0.2068 
Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: BRICS Contagion Effect per Countries: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
 Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
      
FDI it-1 0.630*** 0.641*** 0.635*** 0.631*** 0.636*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0297) (0.0318) (0.0338) (0.0306) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.166** 0.167** 0.150** 0.158** 0.139** 
 (0.0706) (0.0793) (0.0671) (0.0704) (0.0650) 
Capital Control 
Index it-1 
-0.0300** -0.0207 -0.0249* -0.0253* -0.0247 
 (0.0152) (0.0207) (0.0150) (0.0138) (0.0151) 
G-7 Growth it 0.425* 0.460* 0.430* 0.412* 0.447* 
 (0.236) (0.259) (0.236) (0.231) (0.237) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0511 0.128 -0.0473 0.0112 -0.0259 
 (0.0713) (0.0860) (0.0678) (0.0687) (0.0660) 
Brazil Rating it-1 0.182***     
 (0.0514)     
Russia Rating it-1  0.116***    
  (0.0364)    
India Rating it-1   0.165***   
   (0.0422)   
China Rating it-1    0.128***  
    (0.0338)  
South Africa 
Rating it-1 
    0.146*** 
(0.0367) 
      
Observations 428 428 428 428 428 
Number of country 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test      
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.0228 0.0337 0.0254 0.0238 0.0314 
Order 2  p-value                                                   0.2200 0.2097 0.2178 0.2175 0.2106 
      
           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively Numbers in round parentheses (.)     
                  are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Table 8: Countries of the BRICS Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
                                                       Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
                                                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
Brazil Ratingit-1 0.472** 0.133*** 0.130*** 
 (0.214) (0.0289) (0.0189) 
Observations 
Number of country 
168 
9 
150 
8 
110 
6 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.09 0.03 0.08 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.08 0.30 0.75 
Russia Rating it-1 0.268** 0.141*** 0.0735*** 
 (0.118) (0.0409) (0.0228) 
Observations 
Number of country 
168 
9 
131 
7 
129 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.09 0.028 0.06 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.08 0.29 0.14 
India Rating it-1 0.512** 0.144*** 0.124*** 
 (0.219) (0.0326) (0.0291) 
Observations 
Number of country 
149 
8 
150 
8 
129 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.09 0.03 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.06 0.30 0.98 
China Rating it-1 0.370** 0.112*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.188) (0.0270) (0.0224) 
Observations 
Number of country 
149 
8 
150 
8 
129 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                      0.09 0.03 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                     0.07 0.30 0.98 
South Africa Rating it-1 0.417** 0.138*** 0.0934*** 
 (0.194) (0.0320) (0.0278) 
Observations 
Number of country 
168 
9 
131 
7 
129 
7 
Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                      0.09 0.05 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                                    0.07 0.29 0.99 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
 30 
 
   Table 9: Global Financial Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.606*** 0.604*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0394) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.145** 0.147** 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
Rating it-1 0.198*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0482) (0.047) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0304** -0.0291** 
 (0.0148) (0.0146) 
G-7 Growth it 0.366** 0.362** 
 (0.179) (0.1772) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.075 -0.077 
 (0.078) (0.078) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 -0.397 -3.634 
 (0.746) (3.106) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
             0.196 
           (0.162)        
            0.389** 
      (0.168) 
 
Observations 442 442 
Number of country 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
Order 2 p-value 
 
0.02 
0.22 
 
0.02 
0.22 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
              Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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   Table 10 Country’s Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.605*** 0.611*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0341) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.146** 0.150** 
 (0.0642) (0.0630) 
Rating it-1 0.189*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0435) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0320* -0.0308* 
 (0.0166) (0.0162) 
G-7 Growth it 0.405* 0.402* 
 (0.225) (0.226) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0851 -0.106 
 (0.0818) (0.0841) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 1.099 -4.888*** 
 (0.891) (1.518) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.454*** 
         
         0.638*** 
(0.122) 
 
Observations 442 442 
Number of country 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  
Order 2 p-value 
 
0.02 
0.22 
 
0.02 
0.21 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
